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DECRYPTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:
APPLYING FOURTH AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES
TO EVOLVING PRIVACY EXPECTATIONS IN
ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGIES
Candice Gliksberg*
I. INTRODUCTION
A legal battle is brewing between the U.S. government and
technology companies over whether the government has the right to
place limits on digital security measures like encryption.1 The debate
over encryption and government access to digital communications
dates back decades, but for many Americans it came to the fore
following the December 2015 terrorist attack in San Bernardino,2
when the FBI attempted to compel the unlocking of an encrypted
iPhone.3 At the same time, the Senate was considering legislation
that would require technology companies and communications
service providers to weaken their encryption technologies and
provide the government “backdoor” access into consumer devices.4

* J.D. Candidate, May 2018, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Comparative
Literature, University of California, Los Angeles. I wish to thank Professor Karl Manheim for his
guidance, encouragement, and patience, and for explaining the complexities of quantum
computing simply. Special thanks to Professor Cadra, Sigourney Haylock, Michaela Goldstein,
and the other editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their helpful suggestions.
Most importantly, I would like to thank my family, especially my mother, Dina, and my brother,
Richard, for their constant love and support.
1. Sarah Sorcher, The Battle Between Washington and Silicon Valley Over Encryption,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 7, 2015), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/2015
/0707/The-battle-between-Washington-and-Silicon-Valley-over-encryption.
2. Alina Selyukh, A Year After San Bernardino and Apple-FBI, Where Are We on
Encryption?, NPR (Dec. 3, 2016, 1:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016
/12/03/504130977/a-year-after-san-bernardino-and-apple-fbi-where-are-we-on-encryption.
3. Amy Davidson, The Dangerous All Writs Act Precedent in the Apple Encryption Case,
THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 19, 2016), www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/a-dangerous-allwrit-precedent-in-the-apple-case.
4. See Compliance with Court Orders Act of 2016 (Discussion Draft 2016),
https://www.burr.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/BAG16460.pdf.
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At the core of the debate is the balance between individual privacy
and national security.5
The proliferation of the Internet,6 wireless communication,7
portable electronic storage (“e-storage”), electronic commerce (“ecommerce),8 social media,9 and cloud computing10 has changed the
way we live and work. We send personal communications, conduct
financial transactions, and store our personal information (images,
videos, audio recordings, and other private data) in cyberspace.
e-storage has not only made it possible, but commonplace, to carry
entire photo albums, video libraries, written communications,
address books, and the like in one’s pocket, whereas previously these
records would only be found in the home.11 With the shift in Internet
usage from consumption to participation,12 our interactions with
cyberspace can reveal the most intimate details of our lives.13 Simply
using a navigation application on your phone can reveal where you
are, where you have been, and where you are going.14 Electronic
safeguards such as encryption offer a way to protect this information
from prying eyes by locking out anyone who is not authorized to
view it.15 The government’s concern is that encryption affords the
5. The Encryption Tightrope: Balancing Americans’ Security and Privacy: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong., 6 (2016) (statement of James B. Comey, Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation), https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/11478_98899.pdf.
6. Internet/Broadband
Fact
Sheet,
PEW
RES.
CTR.
(Jan.
12,
2017)
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/internet-broadband.
7. Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 12, 2017) http://www.pewinternet.org/factsheet/mobile.
8. Number of Digital Shoppers in the United States Since 2009, STATISTA, https://
www.statista.com/statistics/183755/number-of-us-internet-shoppers-since-2009 (last visited Feb.
6, 2017).
9. Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 12, 2017) http://www.pewinternet.org
/fact-sheet/social-media.
10. See, e.g., Google Drive, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/drive (last visited Feb. 6,
2017).
11. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491–93 (2014).
12. Daniel Nations, What Does ‘Web 2.0’ Even Mean? How Web 2.0 Completely Changed
Society, LIFEWIRE (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-web-2-0-p2-3486624.
13. See, e.g., David Nield, How to See Everything Your Browser Knows About You,
GIZMODO (Dec. 1, 2016, 8:30 AM), http://fieldguide.gizmodo.com/how-to-see-everything-yourbrowser-knows-about-you-1789550766; Geoff Duncan, 7 Ways Your Apps Put You at Risk, and
What You Can Do About It, DIGEST TRENDS (Feb. 26, 2014, 9:22 AM),
http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/seven-ways-apps-put-risk-cant-really.
14. See Duncan, supra note 13.
15. Sean J. Edgett, Double-Clicking on Fourth Amendment Protection: Encryption Creates a
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 339, 340 (2003).
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same protection to criminal entities and terrorists.16 The very same
encryption that protects our information from prying eyes also
prevents detection of malicious activity by watchful eyes.17
However, ever since the whistleblower Edward Snowden revealed
that the National Security Agency was collecting troves of
Americans’ communications records and hacking into the Internet
backbone, there has been widespread mistrust of the government and
its surveillance powers.18 Thus, any legislation proposing to regulate
encryption will likely receive pushback and criticism from
companies and the American public.19
This Note addresses the possible limitations that the Fourth
Amendment20 places on the government’s ability to regulate
electronic security technologies, particularly limitations upon the use
of digital encryption.21 This Note takes the position that encryption
creates a reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s encrypted
information, and thus, encrypted information should be afforded
Fourth Amendment protection. Thus, if regulation effectively limits
or eliminates the ability to encrypt a digital file, it will violate the
Fourth Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches and
seizures. Part II of this Note gives a general overview of encryption.
Part III explains the history and contours of the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement. Part III also defines the reasonable expectation
of privacy doctrine and provides a foundation for why the Fourth
16. See generally Going Dark: Encryption, Technology, and the Balances Between Public
Safety and Privacy: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015) (joint
statement of James B. Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Sally Quillian
Yates, Deputy Attorney General), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/07-0815%20Yates%20and%20Comey%20Joint%20Testimony1.pdf.
17. Id.
18. Sorcher, supra note 1.
19. Michael Heller, Burr-Feinstein Bill Still Looks to Force Companies to Break Encryption,
TECH TARGET (Sept. 13, 2016), http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/450304183/BurrFeinstein-bill-still-looks-to-force-companies-to-break-encryption.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21. Though beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to note that restrictions and
regulations on encrypted communications also raise First and Fifth Amendment concerns. For
example, laws regulating the dissemination and use of encryption have been criticized as an
unconstitutional suppression of free speech for inhibiting the free flow of ideas of people who
wish to communicate using encrypted communications. Norman Andrew Crain, Bernstein, Karn,
and Junger: Constitutional Challenges to Cryptographic Regulations, 50 ALA. L. REV. 869, 870
(1999). Similarly, commentators have noted that compelling an individual to produce his or her
encryption key may violate the Fifth Amendment Privilege against self-incrimination. Scott
Brady, Keeping Secrets: A Constitutional Examination of Encryption Regulation in the United
States and India, 22 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 317, 325–26 (2012).
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Amendment’s evolution will encompass encrypted data. Part IV
evaluates the arguments for and against encryption triggering Fourth
Amendment protection and examines whether case law indicates a
resolution of the matter. Part V examines the effects of the notorious
“third-party doctrine” on encrypted communications. Part VI
proposes that the courts should recognize encryption as a virtualconcealment effort that creates a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the contents of encrypted files. Lastly, Part VII concludes that any
legislation attempting to regulate virtual security measures like
encryption should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and
likely will receive criticism on Fourth Amendment grounds.
II. ENCRYPTION GENERALLY
It is important to understand the encryption process in order to
understand the amount of privacy and security that is afforded by this
cyber technology. In general, the process of encryption scrambles or
encodes the contents of a digital file, making it unreadable to any
computer or person that does not possess the correct decryption
key.22 Once a file has been encrypted, it can be transmitted through
the Internet, shared with other users over a network, or left on a
personal computer, all with the owner of the document retaining
control over who can access the file’s contents.23
A. The Encryption Process
Non-electronic based encryption can be exceedingly simplistic
and far less sophisticated than the advanced digital encryption used
today.24 However, its process is useful for understanding how
encryption works. Encryption works by employing an algorithm to
mix characters of a message with other characters or values in a
seemingly nonsensical way.25 An algorithm can be as simple as
substituting numbers for letters or shifting the letters of the Alphabet
in a given direction by a given number.26 For example, with a shift of

22. See, e.g., SIMON SINGH, THE CODE BOOK: THE EVOLUTION OF SECRECY FROM MARY,
QUEEN OF SCOTS, TO QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY 6, 11 (Anchor Books, 1999).
23. Edgett, supra note 15, at 342.
24. Ciphers, PRAC. CRYPTOGRAPHY, http://practicalcryptography.com/ciphers/caesar-cipher
(last visited Feb. 6, 2017).
25. See generally Singh, supra note 22 (describing the fundamentals of encryption).
26. Ciphers, supra note 24.
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1, “A” would become “B”, “B” would become “C”, and so on.27
Thus, the word “SECRET” would be written “TFDSFU”. To decrypt
the message, the recipient would need to know the key, in this case,
the number of characters to shift the alphabet. Since only the
intended recipient of the message would ordinarily know the key,
anyone else who intercepts the message would see only unintelligible
gibberish (“ciphertext”).28 However, since in this example there are
only a limited number of possible shifts or combinations (e.g., 26
letters in the English alphabet), each combination can be tested in
turn in a short time, even by hand.29 This would be an example of a
“brute force” attack.30
Computer encryption works similarly, but because the
algorithms are being executed by a computer, they can be much more
complex. The strength of encryption is usually measured by key size,
which in turn determines how long it would take a computer to
decrypt the data by brute force attack (i.e., simply trying every
possible combination in order to find the right key).31 Because
computers process information using bits, a brute force attack could
take millennia.32 Each bit is a unit of data that possesses a single
binary value, either a 0 or 1 (i.e., two possibilities).33 This means that
a 128-bit key has 2128 possible combinations, or more than 300
decillion
(300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000)
possible combinations,34 which would take multiple supercomputers
several millennia to crack.35 Thus, it is virtually unbreakable by brute
force attack.

27. Id.
28. Ciphertext is the encrypted form of the original text and is meant to be unintelligible
without the encryption key. The original, unencrypted text is known as plaintext. See Singh,
supra note 22, at 11.
29. Id.
30. TONY HOWLETT, Types of Encryption, in OPEN SOURCE SECURITY TOOLS: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SECURITY APPLICATIONS (2004) (ebook), http://books.gigatux.nl/mirror
/securitytools/ddu/ch09lev1sec1.html.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Nick Parlante & Julie Zelenski, Computer Memory: Bits and Bytes, STANFORD (Apr. 4,
2008), https://see.stanford.edu/materials/icsppcs107/06-Computer-Architecture.pdf.
34. Thom Patterson, Spies Among Us: Get a Peek at Their Playbook, CNN (July 20, 2016),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/20/us/declassified-spycraft-espionage-gear-techniques.
35. Edgett, supra note 15, at 343.
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B. The Importance of the Key
The encryption key is a unique code that keeps a digital file
protected. This makes the key the most important part of the
process.36 The strength of the encryption is dependent upon the key
and not the algorithm used to encode the file or message. 37 Knowing
the algorithm without the key is worthless because the key is the only
thing that can decrypt the message.38 This is why decryption is
analogized to a lock and key in the physical world.39 It is also
important to keep the description of the encryption process in mind
when evaluating whether or not the entire process seems to create a
reasonable expectation of privacy, which would trigger Fourth
Amendment protection. Analyzing case law with this framework in
mind will demonstrate that courts may be on the path to finding that
encrypting documents creates Fourth Amendment protection.
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SHIELD AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.40
The amendment was adopted as a response to the English Crown’s
use of general warrants, which allowed British officers to seize
whomever and whatever they pleased while conducting unrestrained
searches for evidence of criminal activity.41 This abuse of power and
unrestricted invasion of privacy was one of the driving forces behind
the American Revolution itself.42 It is unsurprising then, that the
Supreme Court recognized the Fourth Amendment’s significance as

36. Id. at 344.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
41. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014); see also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
731, 131 (2011).
42. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494.
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a safeguard against abuses by the government,43 and that our courts
take care to uphold it.44 Because the Fourth Amendment is meant to
restrict the government’s power to investigate its citizenry,
governmental limitations on one’s ability to keep digital files and
communications private should be analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment.
A. The Requirement of a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is triggered
whenever a search would infringe upon an individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.45 However, that expectation must be
reasonable from both a subjective and objective point of view. The
standard requires “first, that a person exhibit[] an actual or subjective
expectation of privacy and second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”46
Because it is difficult to contest a defendant’s claim to a
subjective expectation of privacy,47 the primary focus of the test is
what makes an expectation of privacy objectively “reasonable.”48 An
expectation of privacy is constitutionally “reasonable” when it is
backed by an enforceable, extra-constitutional right to enjoin the
government’s invasion of privacy.49 That is, the legitimacy of the
expectation “must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment,
either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to
understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.”50

43. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950).
44. E.g., United States v. Most, 876 F.2d 191, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“We do not believe that
strict enforcement of the fourth amendment will . . . preclude effective law enforcement. Candor
compels us to acknowledge, however, that some crimes escape detection . . . as a result of our
vigilant commitment to constitutional norms. Enforcement of these norms is not, on such
occasions, a pleasant duty; but it is a duty from which judges may not shrink.”).
45. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 151 (1978).
46. 117 AM. JUR. Trials 193 §2 (2012). This two-part test was first articulated in a
concurring opinion by Justice Harlan. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring); see also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (stating that the
reasonable expectation of privacy test “has come to mean the test enunciated by Justice Harlan’s
separate concurrence in Katz.”).
47. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption Create A
“Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?”, 33 CONN. L. REV. 503, 507 (2001).
48. Id. at 507.
49. Id.; see, e.g., Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143–44 n.12.
50. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143–44 n.12.
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B. The Effect of Concealment Efforts on the Reasonable Expectation
of Privacy
When a person seeks to exclude others and takes reasonable
steps to do so, have they created a reasonable expectation of privacy?
It is clear that they exhibit at least a subjective expectation of
privacy.51 For example, in Florida v. Riley, a defendant growing
marijuana on his private property attempted to ensure that no one
knew of the illegal activity by building a fence and covering the
marijuana so that it could not be seen from the street.52 Law
enforcement flew a helicopter over the defendant’s property and
viewed the defendant’s property from the public airspace above.53
The defendant argued that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the enclosed area and that the government should have procured a
warrant before flying over.54 The Court reasoned that although the
defendant could have rationally expected that his fence and
structures would create privacy, the government agents had the right
to enter public airspace, from where they could see the marijuana in
plain view.55 Thus, although the defendant had a subjective
expectation of privacy in his private property, it was not one that
society was prepared to honor.56
Conversely, the Supreme Court has held that “the Fourth
Amendment provides protection to the owner of every container that
conceals its contents from plain view.”57 For example, in United
States v. Chadwick,58 the Court determined there was a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a locked footlocker even though the
footlocker was in public view.59 The Court reasoned that the privacy
interest in the footlocker was not in the container itself, which was
exposed to public view, but in its contents.60 Chadwick had the right
to exclude others from the contents of the footlocker and employed
the footlocker to do so. Similarly, in Bond v. United States,61 the
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–51 (1989).
Id. at 445.
Id. at 448.
Id. at 451–52.
Id. at 450–52.
Id. at 449.
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822–23 (1982).
433 U.S. 1 (1977).
Id. at 11.
Id. at 13–14 n.8.
529 U.S. 334 (2000).
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Court reasoned that a bus passenger exhibited a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his luggage, even though it was not locked,
“by using an opaque bag and placing that bag directly above his
seat.”62 The Court found the opacity of the bag sufficient to satisfy
the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, even absent a lock,
because the bag concealed the contents, thereby excluding prying
eyes.63 In each instance, the Court found the concealment efforts
were ones that society was willing to recognize as affording a
reasonable expectation of privacy.64 It should also be noted that the
Court explicitly refuses to recognize a constitutional distinction
between worthy and unworthy containers, as long as they conceal
their contents from plain view.65
C. Applying These Principles to Encryption
When applied in the context of encryption and the digital world,
these guiding principles should lead to the conclusion that encryption
does indeed trigger Fourth Amendment protection. The sole purpose
of encryption is to prevent unauthorized access to digital files by
rendering them unreadable to those without the decryption key. That
is, the purpose is to exclude and conceal. Encryption serves both to
facilitate and protect electronic communication and the storage of,
often personal, information. The types of data stored and transmitted
electronically are as varied as tangible objects carried in the physical
world. Smart phone, computer, and Internet users enjoy access to
digital calendars,66 photographs,67 address books,68 correspondence
in the form of e-mail messages,69 and diaries in the form of personal

62. Id. at 338–39.
63. Id.
64. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11; Bond, 529 U.S. at 338–39.
65. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982) (noting that for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment, “the most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely entitled to the same
guarantees of privacy as the most majestic mansion,” and thus a traveler’s toothbrush and
clothing carried in a paper bag or scarf should not be treated any differently than a “sophisticated
executive” with a locked briefcase) (citing Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958)).
66. E.g., Google Calendar, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/calendar/answer
/2465776?co=GENIE.Platform%3DDesktop&hl=en (last visited Jan. 2, 2017).
67. E.g., Google Photos, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/photos/about/ (last visited Jan.
2, 2016).
68. E.g., Mac Basics: Address Book, APPLE (Mar. 23, 2016), https://support.apple.com/enus/HT201728.
69. See, e.g., Gmail, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en-GB/mail/help/about.html
(last visited Jan. 2, 2017).
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blogs70—the same materials deemed “highly personal” by the
Supreme Court.71 The fact that the encrypted items are digital should
not diminish the privacy interest in them; after all, the Supreme
Court recognized in Katz v. United States that intangibles are
covered by the Fourth Amendment,72 and in Riley v. California the
Court recognized a privacy interest in digitally stored information.73
Encryption is simply the means to exclusion, the affirmative step
taken to ensure privacy, like the bag in Bond74 or the footlocker in
Chadwick.75
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF EXISTING VIEWPOINTS REGARDING
ENCRYPTION AND THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY TEST
There are two camps of thought regarding whether encryption
itself can trigger a reasonable expectation of privacy.76 One camp
believes that encryption functions like a virtual container.77 The other
compares encryption to a foreign language, arguing that the
encrypted contents are in plain view—they must simply be
translated.78 This section explores both views and responds to their
various arguments. This section also examines indications from
current case law that our judicial system may be on its way to
recognizing that encryption creates a reasonable expectation of
privacy.

70. E.g., About WordPress, WORDPRESS, http://wordpress.org/about (last visited Jan. 2,
2017).
71. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985).
72. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
73. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489, 2494–95 (2014) (deeming cell phones
“minicomputers” that hold “the privacies of life” and stating that “the fact that technology now
allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the information any less
worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought.”). Nor does it matter that digital
communications are usually written, not oral, since the Court has determined that “[l]etters and
other sealed packages are in the general class of effects in which the public at large has a
legitimate expectation of privacy; warrantless searches of such effects are presumptively
unreasonable.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984).
74. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000).
75. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977).
76. See Crain, supra note 21, at 870 (stating that “[e]ncryption technologies serve as the
locks and keys of cyberspace.”); Kerr, supra note 47, at 515–19.
77. David A. Couillard, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment Principles to
Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205, 2231 (2009).
78. Kerr, supra note 47, at 515–19.
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A. Arguments That Encryption Creates a Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy
Most commentators believe encryption is the virtual equivalent
of a lock and key or an opaque container79 because the encryption
algorithm converts plaintext (the contents of the file) into a set of
symbols and scrambled text that mean nothing without the
encryption key, even if one knows the encryption algorithm.80 The
plaintext is literally unviewable (or invisible) because it is concealed
behind a digital ciphertext wall or barrier.81 This is virtual opacity.
Because digital encryption works to ensure that the individual
encrypting the file can control access with the encryption key, it
works just like a locked container and a complete sense of privacy
exists.82
B. Arguments That Encryption Does Not Create a Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy
Still, some respected scholars dismiss this assessment by
pointing out that an encrypted message (or file) can still be viewed,
albeit in encoded form.83 That is, the encrypted message itself
remains in plain view. Thus, they contend that a law enforcement
officer’s observation of such an encrypted message is not a search
and does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.84 Furthermore, they
maintain that the encrypted message, once observed, may be
decrypted without implicating the Fourth Amendment, just as law
79. Crain, supra note 21, at 870 (stating that “[e]ncryption technologies serve as the locks
and keys of cyberspace.”); Edgett, supra note 15, at 350–51; Couillard, supra note 77, at 2232;
Timothy B. Lennon, The Fourth Amendment’s Prohibitions on Encryption Limitation: Will 1995
Be Like 1984?, 58 ALB. L. REV. 467, 487 (1994); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.6(f), at 721 (4th ed. 2004) (quoting Randolph S.
Sergent, Note, A Fourth Amendment Model for Computer Networks and Data Privacy, 81 VA. L.
REV. 1181, 1200 (1995) (“protections such [as] individual computer accounts, password
protection, and perhaps encryption of data should be no less reasonable than reliance upon locks,
bolts, and burglar alarms, even though each form of protection is penetrable.”).
80. Andrew B. Berman, International Divergence: The “Keys” To Signing On the Digital
Line-the Cross-Border Recognition of Electronic Contracts and Digital Signatures, 28
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 125, 128 (2001) (providing a general overview of the encryption
process and its effectiveness to protect documents); See generally Singh, supra note 22.
81. See Edgett, supra note 15, at 365 (“Encryption makes a document invisible to
outsiders . . . . Instead of using physical walls, it creates a digital wall . . . .”).
82. Id. at 350.
83. Kerr, supra note 47, at 515–19; Scott Brady, Keeping Secrets in Cyberspace:
Establishing Fourth Amendment Protection for Internet Communication, 110 HARV. L. REV .
1591, 1604 (1997).
84. Brady, supra note 83, at 1604.; Kerr, supra note 47, at 515–19.
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enforcement agents may “decode” communications they overhear in
foreign languages or idiosyncratic terms (code words) used by street
gangs.85 Finally, they argue that, historically, decrypting encrypted
communications has been held not to violate a reasonable
expectation of privacy and that conclusion does not change in the
Internet or digital context.86
C. Encryption Creates a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The above arguments suggesting encryption does not create a
reasonable expectation of privacy fail in several respects, and this
Note will address each in turn. First, an encrypted message’s
contents are not in plain view; if they were, the very point of
encryption would be defeated. An individual’s privacy interest is in
the plaintext, or original message, which is not in plain view.
Without the encryption key, only the ciphertext (encrypted text) is in
plain view. Much like the locked container in Chadwick, which was
found to trigger Fourth Amendment protection, the privacy interest is
not in the ciphertext but in the original contents or plaintext.87 Thus,
attempting to decrypt the ciphertext by brute force attack would be
like the bus employee in Bond who violated Bond’s Fourth
Amendment privacy interest by attempting to determine the contents
of Bond’s opaque bag by feeling and squeezing it.88
The case of Walter v. United States nicely illustrates these
principles.89 In Walter, 12 packages were delivered to the wrong
company and were opened by its employees.90 Inside the packages
were several boxes of 8-millimeter film.91 On the side of each box
“were suggestive drawings, and . . . explicit descriptions of the
contents.”92 One employee attempted to hold some of the films up to
the light, but was unable to observe the content of the films.93 The
85. Brady, supra note 83, at 1604; Kerr, supra note 47, at 515–19.
86. Kerr, supra note 47, at 532.
87. In Chadwick, there was not a reduced expectation of privacy in the footlocker just
because it was in public view. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11, 13–14 n.8 (1977)
(“Respondents’ principal privacy interest in the footlocker was, of course, not in the container
itself, which was exposed to public view, but in its contents.”).
88. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000).
89. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980).
90. Id. at 651–52.
91. Id. at 652.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 651.
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company contacted the FBI, who viewed the films with a projector
without first obtaining a search warrant.94
Although a majority of the Court concluded that the federal
agents’ viewing of the film with a projector violated the Fourth
Amendment, there was no majority opinion. Justice Stevens authored
the opinion announcing the judgment of the court.95 Justice Stevens
asserted that because the employee was unable to actually view the
content of the films, the petitioners retained their reasonable
expectation of privacy in their contents.96 That the descriptive labels
on the boxes had been exposed merely “gave [the federal agents]
probable cause to believe that the films were obscene . . . and
offended the criminal code.”97 But because the contents of the films
were still not known with certainty, the petitioners’ reasonable
expectation of privacy in their contents remained intact and the
agents needed a warrant to view them with a projector.98 The four
dissenters in Walter believed that no real expectation of privacy
remained in the contents of the films by the time the FBI received
them because the descriptions on the boxes had “clearly revealed the
nature of their contents” to the employees.99 Thus, in the dissenting
Justices’ view, the subsequent viewing of the films by the FBI did
not change the nature of the search and was not an additional
search.100
It is clear that under either Justice Stevens or the dissent’s view,
people who encrypt their communications would maintain a
reasonable expectation of privacy in those communications, thus
triggering Fourth Amendment protections. Just as the contents of the
films in Walter could not be viewed without a film projector, the
contents (plaintext) of an encrypted message cannot be viewed
without the encryption key. While the 8-millimeter film itself was
94. Id. at 654.
95. Id. at 657. Justice White, joined by Justice Brennan in a concurring opinion, believed the
Fourth Amendment was violated because the agents had not obtained a warrant. Id. at 660–62
(White, J., concurring). Justice Marshall also concurred in the judgment but did not write an
opinion. Id. at 660 (Marshall, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 659 (“The private search merely frustrated that expectation in part. It did not
simply strip the remaining unfrustrated portion of that expectation of all Fourth Amendment
protection.”).
97. Id. at 654.
98. Id. at 654, 659.
99. Id. at 663 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 663–64.
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exposed to the employee’s view, the content of the film was not.
Similarly, even if the cyphertext is exposed to or in “plain view” of a
third party, the original content (the plaintext) is not. Moreover,
unlike the boxes that housed the films in Walter, encrypted
cyphertext does not carry any descriptive information that would
“clearly reveal” anything about the plaintext contents of the file or
message or their “nature”. The contents of the encrypted message
remain unknown to the police or a third party until they are
decrypted. Thus, people should retain a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the contents of their encrypted communications.
Second, decrypting an encrypted message is nothing like
“decoding” idiosyncratic terms used by street gangs or
communications in a foreign language that are overheard by officers.
Idiosyncratic terms or “code words” used by gangs are readily
associated with observable actions and events. The true meaning of
the term is already technically known or presumed, it just needs to be
proved. For example, a gang known to deal in drugs uses the word
“shirts” to refer to cocaine. If members of the gang discuss a
shipment of “shirts” they expect at 5:00 pm and are observed
receiving a shipment of cocaine, then the presumption that “shirts”
stands for drugs is simply proven. In contrast, the contents of an
encrypted message are unknown and the key is not usually
guessable. Moreover, a code word is known to and used by multiple
gang members, if not the entire gang, and foreign languages, though
foreign, are generally spoken by millions of people. Encryption does
not work like a foreign language. One unique key is shared between
at most two users.101 If decryption were as simple as translating a
language, for which one can rely on general intelligence and
education, encryption would lack the assurances of privacy that
people rely upon in engaging in online transactions and
communications. Furthermore, “law enforcement could conceivably
‘figure out’ the combination to a padlock more quickly and easily
than it could decrypt modern encryption, but that does not eviscerate
privacy interests in a physically locked container.”102

101. Edgett, supra note 15, at 356–57 (“If individuals speaking a language unique to the two
of them—an equivalent to encryption—then there should be a reasonable expectation of
privacy.”).
102. Couillard, supra note 77, at 2235.
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The third contention, that decrypting encrypted communications
has historically been held not to violate a reasonable expectation of
privacy, is somewhat misleading. None of the cases cited by one
proponent of this argument, Professor Kerr, expressly holds that
decryption does not violate the Fourth Amendment.103 In none of
these cases did the litigants raise the Fourth Amendment issue,104 and
it is not the place or duty of the courts to advocate for the parties. In
any event, all three points fail to address the second prong of the
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test: whether an expectation of
privacy is objectively reasonable.105
In determining whether an expectation of privacy is objectively
reasonable, the Court considers whether society is willing to accept
the expectation as reasonable.106 The use of technology and the
Internet is now commonplace. It is integrated into every aspect of our
lives: from school and work, to banking and shopping, to socializing
and conducting business, to paying taxes and bills. Personal
communications, electronic diaries, trade secrets, and other personal
data rapidly fill hard drives, network servers, and the Internet.
Millions of people and businesses now use cloud computing to store
data on remote servers owned by service providers instead of on their
own hard drives because it is more cost effective and has a larger
capacity. The proliferation of the Internet, e-commerce, and cloud
computing would not have occurred if there were not safeguards
protecting this data and upon which people could rely. In the digital
world, those safeguards are limited to unlisted links, passwords, and
encryption. Though digital protection measures are limited in

103. See, e.g., Allis v. United States, 155 U.S. 117, 120 (1894) (upholding use at trial of
plaintext version of encrypted telegram sent by defendant because no objections were raised or
preserved in the lower courts); Buckley v. United States, 33 F.2d 713, 716 (6th Cir.
1929) (discussing defendant’s own voluntary testimony describing his practice of encrypting his
telegraph messages to conceal their true meaning); Wong v. Esola, 6 F.2d 828, 829 (9th Cir.
1925) (noting that coconspirators communicated via encrypted telegraph communications and
that those communications coincided with the dates of their alleged illegal activities, thus the use
of a cipher telegram was suspicious); see also United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 38 (C.C. Va.
1807) (Marshall, C.J.) (noting that a letter was still in encrypted form and seeking to determine
“whether the letter could be deciphered,” the court ruled that Burr’s secretary could not refuse to
testify regarding his present knowledge of the cipher on Fifth Amendment grounds “because his
present knowledge would not . . . justify the inference that his knowledge was acquired” before
the message was written).
104. See, supra note 103, and accompanying text.
105. Kerr, supra note 47, at 503–07.
106. Id.; Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 151 (1978).
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number, this does not mean they are not powerful. Many encryption
products now available to consumers provide more security and
protection to digital data than is available to most things in the
physical world. Thus, society expects its data to maintain the same
protection in cyberspace as it would if stored on a home computer or
in a home safe. Indeed, society relies on this expectation of
protection daily, with every online transaction or digital
communication sent.
D. Indications from the Courts That Encryption Creates a
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Finally, some of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions indicate
that our judicial system may be on its way to recognizing that
encryption creates an expectation of privacy. In his concurring
opinion in United States v. Jones,107 Justice Alito, writing for four
Justices, remarked that “technology can change” an individual’s
expectations of privacy and thus alter the calculus that courts must
perform.108 Additionally, in her own concurring opinion, Justice
Sotomayor emphasized that technology can disrupt the calculus so
much that “it may be necessary to reconsider” basic Fourth
Amendment premises.109 Similarly, in Riley v. California the Court
noted that analogizing the digital world and processes to the physical
world is difficult and unhelpful; an “analogue test would ‘keep
defendants and judges guessing for years to come.’”110 In Riley, the
Court held that the contents of cell phones cannot be searched
without a warrant, even incident to arrest, because they differ
qualitatively and quantitatively from physical containers in the
amount and types of information they hold.111 Similarly, encryption
differs quantitatively and qualitatively from physical locks and
barriers in the amount of protection it affords. In his Riley
concurrence, Justice Alito noted that “the Court’s broad holding
favors information in digital form over information in hard-copy
form,” but that he “do[es] not see a workable alternative.”112 Even
some lower federal courts seem ready to recognize that digital
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
Id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014).
Id. at 2489–92, 2495.
Id. at 2497 (Alito, J., concurring).
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protection measures can trigger additional Fourth Amendment
protection, even when the government already has lawful access to
the container at issue.
For example, in Trulock v. Freeh,113 law enforcement relied on
the third-party consent exception to the warrant requirement to gain
lawful access to the defendant’s computer.114 Under the consent
exception, voluntary consent to a police search given by a third party
with authority over the subject property makes a warrantless search
reasonable and therefore constitutional.115 A third party has authority
to consent to a search if that third party has either joint access or
control for most purposes.116 In Trulock, the defendant’s live-in
girlfriend, who had access to the defendant’s computer but not his
password-protected files, consented to a search of the defendant’s
property and computer.117 Among the things searched were the
defendant’s password protected documents located in the computer’s
hard drive.118 The court held that the search of the computer was
valid.119 However, the Fourth Circuit found that the search of the
password-protected files was invalid because the files carried an
additional expectation of privacy.120
Still, the lower courts are not in agreement. In United States v.
Andrus,121 law enforcement used forensic software to gain direct
access to the defendant’s hard drive, without first determining
whether a username and password were needed.122 The Tenth Circuit
concluded that the search of the computer was lawful, despite the
fact that the forensic software allowed the police to bypass the
password protection on the defendant’s computer, because the
defendant’s father, who had apparent authority over his son’s
computer,123 had consented to the police search.124 Although the
court in Andrus acknowledged that the function of password
113. 275 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2001).
114. Id. at 398.
115. United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 716 (10th Cir. 2007).
116. Id.; see also United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974).
117. Trulock, 275 F.3d at 398–402.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 403.
120. Id.
121. 483 F.3d 711 (10th Cir. 2007).
122. Id. at 713–14.
123. Id. at 716 (“[A] third party has apparent authority to consent to a search when an officer
reasonably . . . believes the third party possesses [actual] authority to consent.”).
124. Id. at 719–22.
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protection in the computer context is analogous to a lock on a
physical container, it also distinguished password protection from
physical locks because passwords are not readily apparent.125 Despite
the analogous function, the court refused to presuppose that
password protection is so common that a reasonable police officer
should know that a computer is likely to be so protected.126
Contrasting these two holdings illustrates the Supreme Court’s
point in Riley: analogizing the digital world and digital processes to
the physical world is difficult and unhelpful.127
V. THE EFFECT OF THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE ON ENCRYPTED
COMMUNICATIONS
Trulock and Andrus both address situations in which third
parties had access to or control of the object of the search. In such
situations, an expectation of privacy may no longer be reasonable.
A. The Third-Party Doctrine
Under the “third-party” doctrine, which developed from a line of
“third-party cases” decided by the Supreme Court, information that is
voluntarily revealed to third parties does not warrant Fourth
Amendment protection.128 It should be noted, however, that the mere
ability of a third-party intermediary to access the contents of a
communication is not sufficient to extinguish a reasonable
expectation of privacy.129 “Nor is the right of access.”130 In Katz, for
example, telephone companies had both the ability and right to
monitor calls, yet the Supreme Court found that the defendant had a
reasonable expectation of privacy during a telephone call he made
from a public phone booth.131 Likewise, letters and other sealed
125. Id. at 718–19.
126. Id. at 721.
127. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014).
128. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1210 (2004) (“The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held, however, that the Fourth Amendment does not protect information revealed to
third parties.”); see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976); United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745, 749, 754 (1971).
129. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286–87 (6th Cir. 2010).
130. Id. at 287.
131. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
746–47 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (noting that telephone conversations such as the one at
issue in Katz “must be electronically transmitted by telephone company equipment, and may be
recorded or overheard by the use of other company equipment”).
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packages carry with them the sender’s expectation of privacy,132
despite the fact that they are handed over to numerous mail carriers
and are exposed to the risk that any mail handler “could tear open the
thin paper envelopes that separate the private words from the world
outside.”133
Conversely, individuals assume the risk that the third party to
whom they convey information may subsequently reveal that
information to the government when that information is “voluntarily”
turned over or “knowingly exposed” to a third party.134 This
“voluntary act of disclosure invokes the third-party doctrine, which
gives the government additional leeway in obtaining . . . private[]
information.”135 When third-party intermediaries are involved, the
third-party doctrine holds that certain transactional aspects of the
communication may be lawfully obtained from the intermediary.136
The Supreme Court has held that transactional data are part of the
intermediary’s business records. 137 Rather than merely holding the
documents as a neutral third party, the intermediary is in fact an
interested party to the transaction.138 Thus, the Court reasons that an
individual turns the data over to an intermediary with the knowledge
that they will not remain completely private.139 Current law holds
that accounting firms are parties to tax records, banks are considered
parties to the bank records of their customers, mail couriers are
parties to the addresses on the outside of envelopes, and a telephoneservice provider is considered a party to the numbers dialed.140
132. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984).
133. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 285.
134. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (finding that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection”);
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1043 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (“To the extent an individual knowingly exposes his activities to third parties, he
surrenders Fourth Amendment protections . . . ”).
135. Sarah Wilson, Compelling Passwords from Third Parties: Why the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments Do Not Adequately Protect Individuals When Third Parties Are Forced to Hand
Over Passwords, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 15 (2015).
136. Couillard, supra note 77, at 2227.
137. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440–41 (1976) (citing Cal. Bankers Ass’n v.
Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 48–49, 52 (1974)).
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335–36 (1973).
140. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (dialed telephone numbers); Miller,
425 U.S. 435 (1976) (bank records); Couch, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (business and tax records);
Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 905–06 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[I]ndividuals do
not enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in what they write on the outside of an envelope.”).
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For example, in Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that
law enforcement’s use of a pen register141 to record the numbers
dialed from the defendant’s home telephone did not constitute a
search.142 The Court concluded that the defendant did not have the
requisite expectation of privacy to support a Fourth Amendment
claim.143 The Court reasoned that callers can have no expectation of
privacy in numbers they dial because people “realize that they must
‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone company since it is
through the telephone company switching equipment that their calls
are completed.”144 The Court emphasized that telephone users place
calls with the understanding that telephone companies keep records
of numbers dialed “for a variety of legitimate business purposes.”145
According to the Court, “a person has no legitimate expectation of
privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties,”146
and as such, an expectation of privacy in dialed phone numbers is not
one society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.147 Thus, whether
an expectation of privacy is “one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable”148 is dependent, at least in part, on whether
information is voluntarily conveyed and knowingly used.149
B. Third Parties and Expectations of Privacy in Cyberspace
What does this mean in today’s digital world, where the content
of a communication is itself turned over to the service provider in
order to be sent?150 Or in the cloud-computing world, where e-mails,
photos, calendars, and other documents are turned over to cloud
service providers for remote storage?151 For the purposes of this
Note, a simplified understanding of the Internet and e-mail will
141. A pen register is defined as “a device or process which records or decodes dialing,
routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument . . . from which a wire
or electronic communication is transmitted, provided . . . that such information shall not include
the contents of any communication . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2012).
142. Smith, 442 U.S. at 745–46.
143. Id. at 745.
144. Id. at 742.
145. Id. at 743.
146. Id. at 743–44 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–44 (1976)).
147. Id. at 743.
148. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)).
149. Wilson, supra note 135, at 16.
150. Kerr, supra note 128, at 1209–10.
151. Eric Griffith, What Is Cloud Computing?, PC MAG. (May 3, 2016),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2372163,00.asp.
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suffice. The Internet is a global network of computer networks.152 An
Internet user typically has a network account consisting of a block of
computer storage that is owned by a service provider, such as Time
Warner Cable.153 When we use the Internet, we communicate with
and through those remote computers to contact other computers.154
When we write an e-mail message on an e-mail client (e.g., Gmail),
both the message text (in binary code) and the recipient’s e-mail
address are turned over to the service provider, which must
necessarily have access to the contents of the message in order to
send it.155 The service provider then routes the message through
various networks of computers until it reaches the intended
recipient.156 Thus, every network system through which the message
travels could access its content.157 Because routing is dependent upon
current traffic, nobody could know which systems these will be. The
sender knows, however, that his or her Internet Service Provider
(“ISP”) has (and requires) access, as does the recipient’s ISP.158 For
this reason, commentators have argued that in the cyberspace and
Internet context, Fourth Amendment doctrines afford little
protection.159
C. The ECPA and SCA Purportedly Address the Third-Party
Problem in Cyberspace
To address the “dramatic changes in new computer and
telecommunication technologies”160 and the consequences of those
technologies for privacy and Fourth Amendment protection,
Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act161
152. Rus Shuler, How Does the Internet Work? (last updated 2002), https://web.stanford.edu
/class/msande91si/www-spr04/readings/week1/InternetWhitepaper.htm.
153. Kerr, supra note 128, at 1209.
154. Id.
155. How Email Works, RUNBOX, https://runbox.com/email-school/how-email-works/ (last
visited Feb. 6, 2017).
156. See Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational
Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507, 522–24 (2005).
157. Id. at 523.
158. Id. at 523–24.
159. See generally Kerr, supra note 128 (explaining why it may be difficult under current
Fourth Amendment doctrine to offer strong privacy protections online); Jim W. Ko, The Fourth
Amendment and the Wiretap Act Fail to Protect Against Random ISP Monitoring of E-Mails for
the Purpose of Assisting Law Enforcement, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 493
(2004).
160. S. Rep. No. 99-541 (1986).
161. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012).
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(“ECPA”) in 1986. The ECPA was meant to amend the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968, often called the Wiretap
Act.162 The Wiretap Act, as originally drafted, proscribed the
unauthorized interception of oral and wire communications such as
telephone calls.163 The ECPA extended restrictions on government
wiretaps from telephone calls to include real-time interception of
transmissions of electronic data by computer, such as e-mails.164
Title II of the ECPA, known as the Stored Communications Act
(“SCA”), addresses the voluntary and compelled disclosure of stored
communications and transactional records held by third-party service
providers.165 Section 2702(a) of the SCA generally bans voluntary
disclosure by service providers of content as well as non-content
records to any government entities, except when certain narrow,
limited exceptions apply.166
D. The Content versus Non-Content Distinction
As illustrated above, the SCA distinguishes content information
from non-content information.167 This is likely for reasons that most
people find intuitive: the contents of messages generally implicate
greater privacy concerns than information about those
communications.168 The functional role of the distinction to a
communications network may also explain the different treatment the
two categories receive under the SCA.169 Content information is the
communication that an individual wishes to share only with the
intended recipient.170 In contrast, non-content information
(sometimes referred to as “envelope” information) is information
about the communication that the service provider or network uses to
162. Pub.L. 90-351, Title III, § 802, June 19, 1968, 82 Stat. 212.
163. Ko, supra note 159, at 512.
164. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2521 (2012).
165. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012).
166. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a), (b)(5)–(8). A provider can disclose contents when: disclosure is
needed to protect the provider from unauthorized use of the network; a provider discovers images
of child pornography that the provider must disclose to the police by federal law; the provider
inadvertently discovers evidence that relates to a crime, and; when disclosure is necessary given a
dangerous emergency.
167. See id. § 2703(a)–( b) (compelled disclosure of content information); id. § 2703(c)
(compelled disclosure of non-content information); id. § 2702(b) (voluntary disclosure of
contents); id. § 2702(c) (voluntary disclosure of non-content records).
168. Kerr, supra note 128, at 1228.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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deliver and process the content information.171 Under the SCA,
“contents” include “any information concerning the substance,
purport, or meaning of [a] communication.”172 This clearly covers
the body of electronic communications such as e-mails, that is, the
actual text of the message.173 It also arguably covers the subject line
of the e-mail, since the subject line generally carries a substantive
message. 174 It does not cover e-mail to/from addresses, for example,
because the service provider needs this information to route
communications.175
The content versus non-content distinction was also drawn by
the Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland. There, the Court noted that
law enforcement’s use of a pen register differed significantly from
the listening device used in Katz because pen registers “do not
acquire the contents of communications.”176 The court also noted that
a pen register does not reveal who was on either end of the line or
whether the call was even completed.177
E. The Effect of the ECPA and the Content versus Non-Content
Distinction on Encryption
Especially in light of the distinction between content and noncontent information, encryption should trigger Fourth Amendment
protection. If the law already acknowledges that contents that are
knowingly exposed to service providers deserve privacy protections
under the ECPA, then contents that are concealed using digital
security measures like encryption should be entitled to additional
protection under the Fourth Amendment. In Smith v. Maryland, the
Court noted that the defendant could not preserve the privacy of the
number he dialed because, regardless of his attempts to keep the
conversation private, he had to convey the number to the telephone
company if he wished to complete his call.178 The fact “that he dialed
the number on his home phone made no conceivable difference, nor

171. Id.
172. See 18 U.S.C. § 2711(1); 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8).
173. Kerr, supra note 128, at 1228.
174. Id.
175. In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 611 (5th Cir. 2013); United States
v. Forrester, 495 F.3d 1041, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2007).
176. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (emphasis added).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 743.
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could any subscriber rationally think that it would.”179 Conversely,
encrypting a file or message before sending it renders it unreadable
to the service provider and others without the decryption key.
Nevertheless, the message or file can still be processed by the thirdparty service provider and routed to its intended recipient in its
encrypted, ciphertext form. In this way, encrypting the contents of a
message is very much like putting a letter in an envelope. The
message can be conveyed to a third-party intermediary without
revealing its contents.
Yet it was not the content versus non-content distinction that
ultimately made the difference in the outcome of Smith v. Maryland;
the deciding factor was whether the defendant’s expectation of
privacy in the dialed numbers was one that society was prepared to
recognize as reasonable.180 Thus, while the government can utilize
the ECPA to compel disclosure of content information and contents
of communications, most courts have nevertheless recognized that
there is both a subjective and objective expectation of privacy in the
contents of e-mails, and therefore afforded e-mails Fourth
Amendment protection.181 E-mails contain the contents of an
individual’s business and personal life, and it is highly unlikely that
individuals “expect[] them to be made public.”182 Like the telephone
user, an e-mail user is “entitled to assume that the words he utters
into [a device] will not be broadcast to the world.”183
Given the fundamental similarities between e-mail and other
traditional forms of communication, like the telephone and the letter,
it would “defy common sense to afford e-mails less protection.”184
Such recognition by courts demonstrates the current understanding of
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284–86 (6th Cir. 2010); In re
Application for Search Warrants for Info. Associated with Target Email Address, No. 12-MJ8119-DJW, 2012 WL 4383917, at *5 (D. Kan. Sept. 21, 2012) (holding that “an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in emails” and that the Fourth Amendment protections apply to
email); Matter of the Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@mac.com that is Stored at
Premises Controlled by Apple, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting the “obvious
expectation of privacy e-mail account holders have in their communications”); United States v.
DiTomasso, 2014 WL 5462467, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2014) (No. 14-CR-160SAS) (holding
that defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails but waived this Fourth
Amendment protection by agreeing to AOL’s terms of service).
182. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 284.
183. Wilson, supra note 135, at 13 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967)).
184. Id. (quoting Warshak, 631 F.3d at 285–86).
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society’s expectations in relation to electronic communication
technologies. After all, having been enacted more than twenty years
before Apple released the first iPhone in 2007, the ECPA and SCA
are vastly outdated by the current state of electronic communication
technology.
VI. COURTS SHOULD RECOGNIZE VIRTUAL-CONCEALMENT EFFORTS
TO STANDARDIZE PRIVACY APPRAISALS IN DIGITAL CONTEXTS
The use of encryption to protect communications in transit or to
secure data stored on a hard drive or remote server has become
common practice.185 Indeed, tech companies and service providers
tout their encryption technologies in order to attract customers.186
Given the pervasiveness of encryption, its effectiveness as an
electronic security measure, and society’s reliance upon it, courts
should recognize that the use of encryption to protect the privacy of
digital files and communications creates a reasonable expectation of
privacy under the Fourth Amendment—one that society has already
demonstrated it is willing to recognize.
Furthermore, given the difficulty and futility of comparing
digital technologies to physical-world analogues, courts should
follow the advice of the Supreme Court in Riley. That is, courts
should not analogize digital technologies to the physical world,187 but
should instead look to the qualitative and quantitative differences or
effects of a particular technology and its current use in our society.188
Thus, courts should acknowledge that, although encryption is one of
a limited number of security options in the digital context, its
function is to protect the privacy of digital contents. Courts should
also acknowledge that encryption differs qualitatively and
quantitatively from physical-world security measures. Because it
would take an unauthorized user millennia to determine a decryption

185. See Our Approach to Privacy, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/privacy/approach-toprivacy
(last
visited
Feb.
6,
2017);
End-to-End
Encryption,
WHATSAPP,
https://www.whatsapp.com/faq/en/general/28030015 (last visited Feb. 6, 2017); Making End to
End Encryption Easier to Use, GOOGLE (Jun. 3, 2014), https://security.googleblog.com
/2014/06/making-end-to-end-encryption-easier-to.html.
186. See Our Approach to Privacy, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/privacy/approach-toprivacy/
(last
visited
Feb.
6,
2017);
End-to-End
Encryption,
WHATSAPP,
https://www.whatsapp.com/faq/en/general/28030015 (last visited Feb. 6, 2017).
187. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014).
188. Id. at 2489–92.
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key, current encryption standards are virtually unbreakable.189 One
“could conceivably ‘figure out’ the combination to a padlock more
quickly and easily than [one] could decrypt modern encryption, but
that does not eviscerate privacy interests in . . . physically locked
container[s].”190
By recognizing that the use of digital encryption affords a
reasonable expectation of privacy, the courts will prevent legislation
that would allow law enforcement to use a technological backdoor to
avoid Fourth Amendment limitations.
VII. CONCLUSION
Nevertheless, whether encryption itself triggers Fourth
Amendment protection has not yet been addressed by the Supreme
Court. The current state of the law allows law enforcement to create
a copy of lawfully obtained digital files in their encrypted form, after
which the government is free to attempt decryption without an
additional warrant.191 Moreover, the argument for encryption
triggering Fourth Amendment protection only has merit if the
encryption key is privately held or generated by the user (i.e., is not
known to or held by the service provider). For example, Gmail,
which provides encryption to protect communications in transit from
hackers, also retains the encryption keys in order to scan a user’s
e-mails to deliver relevant advertisements to the user.192 Under
CALEA,193 an amendment to the ECPA, service providers must
provide the contents in decrypted form if they have access to the
customer’s encryption key. For this reason, companies like Apple,
WhatsApp, and Proton Mail use encryption models that purposely
put the keys beyond the company’s reach and solely in the user’s

189. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, CRYPTOGRAPHY’S ROLE IN SECURING THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY 63 (Kenneth W. Dam & Herb S. Lin eds., National Academy Press 1996) (describing
how increasing the key size slightly will increase the time it takes a single computer to decipher a
document from a few days to 2,000 years).
190. Couillard, supra note 77, at 2235; see also Roland Pease, ‘Unbreakable’ Encryption
Unveiled, BBC NEWS (Oct. 9, 2008, 1:50 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science
/nature/7661311.stm. (explaining that recently unveiled quantum encryption offers security using
the “inherently unbreakable” laws of quantum theory).
191. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(B) (2016); Kerr, supra note 47, at 518.
192. Hollie Slade, The Only Email System the NSA Can’t Access, FORBES (May 19, 2014,
11:54 AM) http://www.forbes.com/sites/hollieslade/2014/05/19/the-only-email-system-the-nsacant-access/#6ecd192055ed.
193. 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (2012).
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control.194 Even if served with a warrant, these companies could not
disclose the plaintext, only the ciphertext.
Because more and more companies are consciously moving
toward this standard of encryption, CALEA is no longer helpful.
Such service providers can only be compelled to provide ciphertext.
Thus, even if the government first obtains a warrant to seize files or
the “container” on which the files are located and is free to decrypt
those files, current levels of encryption still pose a serious
impediment to law enforcement. The FBI itself has stated that our
law enforcement lacks the resources and technical ability to crack
such encryption.195 One company, however, has begun selling
quantum computers196 to cybersecurity agencies and law
enforcement in an effort to combat the “unhackable” encryption
strategies in use today.197 Quantum computers can run computations
in a coffee break that would take a supercomputer of today millions
of years.198 In response, the technology community is developing
quantum encryption,199 leading to an all-out crypto arms race.200 For
these reasons, legislation regulating encryption has been proposed.201
194. See Our Approach to Privacy, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/privacy/approach-toprivacy
(last
visited
Feb.
6,
2017);
End-to-End
Encryption,
WHATSAPP,
https://www.whatsapp.com/faq/en/general/28030015 (last visited Feb. 6, 2017); Slade, supra note
192.
195. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., GOING DARK, GOING FORWARD: A PRIMER ON THE
ENCRYPTION DEBATE (2016), https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/StaffReport-Going-Dark-Going-Forward-Version-2.0.pdf.
196. A normal computer uses bits (data that can exist in two states: zero or one). Quantum
computers use quantum bits, or “qubits,” which can be zero, one, or any state in between. This
means that the computational abilities and speed of a supercomputer are exponentially increased.
Nicola Davis, Quantum Computing Explained: Harnessing Particle Physics to Work Faster, THE
GUARDIAN (Mar. 6, 2014, 1:59 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2014/mar/06
/quantum-computing-explained-particle-mechanics.
197. Lily Hay Newman, Quantum Computers Versus Hackers, Round One. Fight!, WIRED
(Jan. 27, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/01/quantum-computers-versus-hackersround-one-fight.
198. Tom Simonite, Google’s Quantum Dream Machine, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 18, 2015),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/544421/googles-quantum-dream-machine.
199. Quantum encryption exploits the properties of physics and literally encodes atomic light
particles, called photons, with information. Because quantum encryption exploits the laws of
physics, quantum computing, which exploits statistical and mathematical concepts, will not help
decrypt communications encrypted using quantum encryption technologies. Devin Powell, What
Is Quantum Cryptography? And Can it Make Codes Truly Unbreakable?, POPULAR SCI. (Mar. 3,
2016), www.popsci.com/what-is-quantum-cryptography.
200. Adam Mann, Laws of Physics Say Quantum Cryptography Is Unhackable. It’s Not.,
WIRED (Jun. 7, 2013, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/06/quantum-cryptography-hack/.
201. See generally Compliance with Court Orders Act of 2016 (Discussion Draft 2016),
https://www.burr.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/BAG16460.pdf;
The
Encryption
Tightrope:
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Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed in this Note, any attempt at
regulation should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and will
likely receive criticism on Fourth Amendment grounds.

Balancing Americans’ Security and Privacy: Hearing before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
114th Cong. (2016) (statement of James B. Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation).

